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A. Introduction 
The endemic corruption of weak governments in poor nations is a major impediment 
not only to the economic development of ill-served peoples, but also to the development 
of world trade that could benefit both those who work for a living and those who man-
age them. Public corruption, like private greed, is a problem everywhere. It was a typi-
cal feature not only of the Roman Empire,1 but also of many and perhaps most colonial 
regimes from their beginnings through the twentieth century.2 According to Judith 
Shklar, wherever there is a self-serving elite, there is a need to “guard the guardians” 
against this form of original sin.3 Benjamin Franklin wisely observed, “[t]here is no 
kind of dishonesty into which otherwise good people more easily and frequently fall, 
than that of defrauding the government.”4 This is so in part because the line of moral 
conduct in public service is not always clearly drawn. The faint line between a cam-
paign contribution and a bribe provides an example of this lack of clarity.5 Family inter-
ests, longstanding friendships and political alliances constitute other examples. How-
ever, such complexities do not cloud the simple problem of plain bribery of public offi-
cers by the private firms with whom they deal. 
Corruption is an especially difficult problem in poor nations endowed with natural re-
sources highly valued by people in wealthier nations.6 According to reports from the 
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2 See, e.g., Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain, Cambridge 
(Mass.) 2006. 
3 Shklar, Ordinary Vices, 1984, 243-244. 
4 Jackson, Historical Review of the Constitution and Government of Pennsylvania, 1759; Benjamin 
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World Bank, bribes totaling a trillion dollars were paid out in 2002.7 The larger propor-
tion of that amount was undoubtedly paid by firms that extract and export natural re-
sources for sale in the developed world. A timely example of the evil is provided by the 
“biggest heist in modern history”,8 the United Nations’ Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq. 
Major corporate enterprises around the planet shared in illicit benefits from, and in the 
responsibility for, schemes leaving the Iraqi population undernourished despite the 
many billions of dollars theoretically deployed to feed them. Only a few of the many 
offenders have been punished for participating in that heist.9 The governments of most 
oil-producing nations are squalid in bribery; Nigeria and Kazakhstan serve as additional 
premier examples of nations in which the national wealth has been appropriated for the 
personal benefit of a few officials and the foreign firms with which they deal.10 Strenu-
ous efforts within the World Bank to deal with the problem have resulted in turmoil 
within the Bank’s leadership; we are told that “many in the bank” have remained “aller-
gic” to the prosecution of the borrowers they deal with.11 
The prevention or deterrence of corruption by law, where substantially achieved, re-
quires cultural traditions of mutual respect sufficient to bring about the professional 
independence of judges and other civil servants responsible for law enforcement,12 and 
also requires an investment of public resources sufficient to maintain legal institutions 
with the requisite measure of independence. Poor nations often lack both the resources 
and the traditions. Their judiciaries might be likened, as an old metaphor has it, to low-
wage waiters in elegant hotels who were absolutely forbidden to accept tips.13 Under-
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enforcement of law is therefore chronic and often grave in such nations.14 Unless some 
form of redress is provided, it would result in a “failing” and then a “failed” state. It has 
been explained thus:  
“Corruption is fundamental to failed states. Not only does it flourish in failed states, 
but in them it thrives on an unusually destructive scale. Widespread petty or lubricat-
ing corruption exists as a matter of course, but failed states are noted for rising levels 
of venal corruption: kickbacks on anything that can be put out to fake tender or bid 
(medical supplies, textbooks, constructions, roads, railways, tourism concessions, new 
airports, and so on); unnecessarily wasteful construction projects arranged so as to 
maximize the rents that they are capable of generating; licenses for existing or imagi-
nary enterprises and activities; and a persistent and generalized extortion. Moreover, 
corrupt ruling elites invest their profits overseas, not at home, thus contributing yet 
further to the economic attrition of their own states.”15 
Unless and until a means can be devised to deter bribery in impecunious nations, global-
isation could be of minimal benefit to a majority of the inhabitants of those nations for 
they are destined to be governed weakly, if at all, and to serve as havens for all sorts of 
gangsters and terrorists. One need not be a humanitarian to take the transnational cor-
ruption problem seriously. 
This essay responds to that concern. It considers some possible reforms of interna-
tional law that might serve to deter the corruption of weak governments. All its sugges-
tions entail the use of the American practice of private enforcement of public law, a 
system that minimises dependence on public officials who are subject to capture by 
wealthy outsiders.16 Privatised law enforcement in the American tradition generally 
threatens legal consequences of harmful practices ex post rather than preventing harm-
ful practices ex ante. It offers the advantage of greater freedom to businesses in the con-
duct of transactions. However, the immense costs associated with it have generated re-
sistance from many businessmen in the United States against whom law is often pri-
vately enforced and from wise lawyers of other lands endowed with public institutions 
that can be and are trusted to enforce public law.17 
The relevance of the American practice of privatised law enforcement to the corrup-
tion problem may result from the historical fact that it is a product of a nineteenth-
century culture that shared very limited trust in government and its officers. Its cultural 
situation thus bears some resemblance to situations both in impoverished lands and in 
the community of nations hoping for the enforcement of a mechanism of international 
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the Dogs of War, Washington 2007, 87. 
16 Similar ideas for protecting against corruption by public officials are advanced in Berger/Holland, 
Why the Private Sector is Likely to Lead the Next Stage in the Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 
Fordham Int’l L. J. 2006, 69-74. See also Hodges, Europeanization of Civil Justice: Trends and Is-
sues, 26 Civil Justice Q. 2007, 96. 
17 I have in recent years been on a campaign to elevate transnational awareness of this fundamental 
difference. See, e.g., Carrington, The American Tradition of Private Law Enforcement, in: Bit-
burger Gespräche, Jahrbuch 2003, 33; Carrington, Foreign Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts: Private En-
forcement of Public Law, 9 Waseda Bull. of Comp. L. 2007, 149. 
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law which prohibits corrupt practices. It is a system of law enforcement that reduces the 
law’s dependence on the integrity of judges, prosecutors, and other public servants. 
Wherever public integrity is in great doubt, the American experience may possibly offer 
useful instruction.18 
B. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Recognition in the United States of the problem of transnational corruption dates back 
to the Cold War period. American firms had long been accustomed to offering bribes to 
officials of foreign governments, in violation of their laws, in order to secure profitable 
public contracts. It was fair to assume that such payments were sometimes indispensa-
ble conditions of foreign trade because contracts were often awarded to the highest bid-
der, that is, the most generous briber.19 Although bribes paid in violation of state or fed-
eral laws were not treated as business expenses deductible from income for tax purposes 
(and so were paid with after-tax dollars), bribes paid to foreign officials were deducti-
ble, regardless of their illegality under foreign law (and thus in a sense subsidised by the 
United States government).20 
Securities regulation laws enacted in the 1930s imposed public-law standards on ac-
counting practices of corporations whose shares are sold publicly.21 Even foreign firms 
listing securities on American exchanges were required to file accurate financial infor-
mation to be made available to investors. Problems arose in accounting for foreign 
bribes paid by firms so listed: was it necessary to reveal such payments to investors? If 
so, recipients and informers were put at risk. Compliance was imperfect. 
The Watergate scandal and the misuse of corporate money to fund President Nixon’s 
1972 presidential campaign led to an investigation by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of reported expenses that might have been payments made for the 
purpose of gaining illicit advantage with government officials. The investigation re-
vealed widespread use of false accounting methods aimed at concealing bribes paid to 
foreign officials.22 The SEC initiated the practice of investigating such reporting and 
seeking injunctions to compel companies to make full disclosures in the financial state-
ments distributed to investors.23 It also initiated a voluntary disclosure program that led 
to the revelation that more than 450 companies had concealed at least $400 million in 
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19 For reflection on the problem, see Reisman, Folded Lies: Bribery, Crusades, and Reforms, New 
York 1979, 161-73. 
20 Internal Revenue Code 26 U.S.C. § 162(c)(1) (2000). 
21 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2000)). 
22 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report of the SEC on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and 
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bribes paid to foreign officials. Among the scandals revealed was the payment of a mil-
lion dollars by The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to Prince Bernhard of the Nether-
lands to secure a sale of military aircraft.24 
The political reaction to these scandals was instigated by Senator William Proxmire 
of Wisconsin.25 He observed that the revelation diminished the moral stature of the 
United Sates in the competition of the Cold War by “eroding public confidence in our 
institutions.”26 He proposed to make more explicit the SEC responsibility for disclosure. 
Thus, the provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enacted in 1977 re-
quired transparent accounting by 
“any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of this title 
or which is required to file reports under section 780(d) of this title, or for any officer, 
director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf 
of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce ...”27 
It was observed that the SEC had authority only over firms filing public accounting 
statements, and not over those American firms that were privately owned. Accordingly, 
a mechanism of criminal law to be enforced by the Department of Justice was deemed 
essential, and was also enacted.28 It was adopted by a unanimous vote in both Houses of 
Congress and signed by President Carter in 1977.29 
Thus, while the SEC retained authority to seek injunctions against accounting prac-
tices that concealed such payments, the task was assigned to the Department of Justice 
to prosecute serious offenders. These two institutions were expected to collaborate in 
the enforcement of the law. Firms in which Americans were likely to invest faced pun-
ishment for concealing illegal payments or offers of payment to officers of foreign gov-
ernments as well as those paid in the United States. 
As other investment markets have grown in Europe and Asia, global firms have relied 
more frequently on investors in markets outside the United States. Some firms in the 
United States have been able to avoid accounting regulations by trading their invest-
ments privately through investment vehicles such as hedge funds.30 These developments 
diminish the effectiveness of the SEC and its disclosure requirements as instruments to 
deter the bribery of foreign officials. Moreover, this trend may be growing as a result of 
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25 Towell/Hagen, Foreign Bribes: Stiff Penalties Proposed, 35 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 14 May 1997, 929. 
26 Towell/Hagen, ibid. 
27 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2000). 
28 For a chronicle of the legislative history, see Cruver, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: A Guide for U.S. Firms Doing Business in the International Marketplace, 2d ed., Chicago 1999, 
1-12. 
29 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. (91 Stat.) 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2000)). 
30 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market 
Failure (Columbia Law Sch., Center for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 158, 1999), 
available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=190568>. 
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the elevated standards imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms of 2002,31 which have 
led to the withdrawal of numerous firms from the American investment market. Firms 
departing from the public investment market in the United States thereby avoid the dis-
closure requirements and therefore have less cause for concern about the possible en-
forcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
The criminal-law provisions of the FCPA that are enforced by the Department of Jus-
tice prohibit “corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, [any] promise to pay, or 
authorisation of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorisa-
tion of the giving of anything of value” directly or indirectly to a foreign official for the 
purpose of influencing an official decision with respect to securing or retaining busi-
ness.32 These prohibitions are applicable to all American domestic concerns whether or 
not they were registered on a stock exchange, so long as any part of the transaction oc-
curred in the United States (or in its territorial waters), in interstate commerce, or by 
post. Regulated firms are generally responsible for the corrupt conduct of their employ-
ees.33 However, the prohibitions of the 1977 law would not apply to citizens of foreign 
nations acting on behalf of foreign subsidiaries of American firms if the citizens’ con-
ducts occurred outside the United States.34 
The FCPA was written only as public law to be enforced by the SEC and as criminal 
law to be enforced by the Department of Justice; no provision was made for enforce-
ment in civil actions brought by private plaintiffs.35 However, a violation of the Act 
resulting in harm to competing firms exposes the offender to civil liability under the 
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).36 Furthermore, 
bribery is also a violation of state tort law if it causes foreseeable harm to a business 
competitor or others.37 As Judge Richard Posner opined: “[B]ribery is a deliberate tort, 
and one way to deter it is to make it worthless to the tortfeasor by stripping away all his 
gain.”38 Indeed, it is the sort of deliberate tort that may expose the wrongdoer to liability 
for punitive damages calculated and awarded to discourage repetition of the misdeed. 
Of course, plaintiffs in civil actions in state or federal courts may be represented by 
lawyers who have agreed to charge fees contingent on success, and under the “Ameri-
can Rule”, they would be subjected to a low level of risk of liability for the defendants’ 
                                                   
31 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see generally Ar-
mour/McCahery, After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in 
Europe and the US. Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2006-07. Avail-
able at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=910205>. 
32 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998). See generally Deming, The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act and the New International Norms, Chicago 2005, 7-20. 
33 To some it seems unjust that innocent shareholders should bear a resulting loss caused by the crimi-
nal misconduct of their employees. Coffee, Jr., No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An Unscandal-
ized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Michigan Law Review 1981, 386 et seq. 
34 Deming (op. cit. fn. 32), 8. 
35 See generally Lamb v. Phillip Morris Inc., 915 F. 2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Kay, 359 
F. 3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
36 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Techtronics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990). Cf. Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. 
Société Nat. des Pétroles du Congo, No. 05 Civ. 5101, 2006 WL 846351 (S.D.N.Y. 31 March 2006). 
37 Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29 (2003). 
38 Williams Elec. Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 366 F. 3d 569 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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fees if they were to lose their cases. There are therefore few disincentives for plaintiffs 
having reason to believe that they have been victims of corrupt decisions to file a suit. 
Moreover, in the United States, plaintiffs also have recourse to rules of civil procedure 
that facilitate private investigation of disputed facts.39 Such recourse is comparable to 
that available to civil servants conducting governmental investigations. That an official 
act of a foreign sovereign may be called into question is not an impediment to such civil 
enforcement.40 
Also, if the occasion requires, possibilities exist in the United States for multiple 
plaintiffs to aggregate their claims thereby presenting them more efficiently and effec-
tively. In cases where plaintiffs or defendants are apprehensive of the political sensitivi-
ties of the judiciary, they may demand trial by jury, an institution that is virtually im-
mune to bribery or intimidation. 
All these familiar provisions of American law facilitate the role of private plaintiffs as 
the primary enforcers of many laws enacted to serve such public aims as those served 
by the FCPA. Not least among the national laws privately enforced are the securities 
laws prohibiting fraud.41 So far, private claims in American courts relating to damages 
resulting from foreign corruption have been few. However the Act’s criminal-law provi-
sions are reinforced by the prospect of possible civil liability and that prospect may add 
materially to its deterrent effect. 
At the time of the enactment of the FCPA, the United States Internal Revenue Code 
was revised to prohibit income-tax deductions for bribes paid in violation of foreign 
law.42 The federal government would no longer bear part of the cost of foreign corrupt 
practices. 
The International Chamber of Commerce paid tribute to the American FCPA when a 
year later it promulgated its Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery. These 
were “ineffective as a practical matter”,43 but reflected the policy of the FCPA. 
Because the FCPA was unique to the United States, it was a continuing source of un-
rest among American businessmen whose ability to compete in many markets was 
threatened by a reluctance to engage in corruption. It was alleged that contracts with 
foreign governments worth billions of dollars were not concluded because of the inabil-
ity of American firms to match the bribes offered by their foreign competitors. Given 
the ease with which the law could be evaded through the use of employees of foreign 
corporate subsidiaries trained to conceal their corrupt practices from top management, 
                                                   
39 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a) (permitting parties to take depositions). 
40 E.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., (supra fn. 36). 
41 See generally Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation, 5th ed., St. Paul 2006. 
42 26 U.S.C. § 162(c)(1) (1998): “No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any payment 
made, directly or indirectly, to an official or employee of any government, or of any agency or in-
strumentality of any government, if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback or, if the 
payment is to an official or employee of a foreign government, the payment is unlawful under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.” 
43 Cruver (op. cit. fn. 28), 81. 
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claims of enormous economic loss must be approached with caution. However, some 
lost deals could well have been substantial ones.44 
Although the FCPA was enforced by both the SEC and the Department of Justice, 
there were very few cases of enforcement prosecutions, and most of the cases brought in 
the first three decades were privately settled with guilty pleas.45 There were, however, a 
few notable exceptions. For example, a case brought against ten defendants accused of 
bribing officials of a Mexican national oil company went to trial; all were convicted.46 
Another highly publicised case was brought against General Electric in 1992 for its cor-
rupt links with an Israeli general; the company pleaded guilty to four federal offenses 
and paid $69 million in fines. General Electric was also convicted of violating the 
Money Laundering Control Act.47 Another striking example was the civil suit filed by 
the SEC in 1996 against an Italian firm listed on the New York Stock Exchange which 
had been accused of concealing millions of dollars in bribes paid to Italian politicians; it 
was enjoined by accounting practices which concealed the corruption.48 
The FCPA was first amended in 1988.49 American firms who had “reason to know”50 
that their money was finding its way into unworthy pockets, had faced the likelihood of 
punishment under the 1977 Act. Businessmen had found this phrase daunting, and Con-
gress responded to the concern by reducing the phrase to “punish only those aware that 
the [corrupt] result is substantially certain to occur.”51 In one of the more recent re-
ported criminal cases, it was held that officers of an accused firm should have known 
that a bribe was being paid.52 Liability under the amended Act may arise if the firm 
authorises the misdeed explicitly or implicitly or merely acquiesces. The bribe may as-
sume the modest form of an airline ticket.53 Liability is to be imposed even if the mis-
deed had been performed by a foreign partner or an affiliated firm. One may be guilty of 
a conspiracy to corrupt a foreign official. Individuals within a firm need not have all the 
requisite information enabling the employee to assess the likelihood that a bribe is being 
paid.54 In these latter respects, the 1988 amendments toughened the criminal law in-
                                                   
44 For an assessment of the consequences, see Prasad, Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977 on U.S. Export, 1993 (presenting and analysing data on the impact of anti-corruption measures 
on U.S. trade). 
45 See Deming (op. cit. fn. 32), 6. 
46 See generally United States v. Crawford Enterprises, Inc. 645 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Tex. 1986). For an 
account of the extensive practice of bribery in Mexico in the 1980s, see Riding, Distant Neighbors: 
A Portrait of the Mexicans, 1989, 112-33 (describing the necessity of corruption in the Mexican po-
litical system). 
47 See generally United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 808 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Ohio 1992). 
48 Cruver (op. cit. fn. 28), 67. 
49 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1415 
(1988). 
50 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
51 15 U.S.C.S. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(i) (1998). 
52 United States v. King, 321 F. 3d 859 (8th Cir. 2003). 
53 E.g., United States v. Liebo, 923 F. 2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991). 
54 See generally United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F. 2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). 
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tended to deter private corruption of foreign governments. But it did not result in nu-
merous prosecutions and convictions in a world filled with offenders.  
That may change very soon. The Department of Justice no longer relies on self-
reporting and has substantially increased the number of its investigative staff. Accord-
ing to reports, American businesses creating joint ventures with Chinese companies or 
acquiring Chinese outfits are particularly susceptible to liability because of the probabil-
ity of such ventures being corrupt.55 Moreover, the Department has now for the first 
time not only begun to prosecute individual officers who participate in such briberies, 
but also requires their employers to disgorge profits from deals acquired through their 
crimes. Among those presently being prosecuted is a member of Congress.56 And in 
2009, the Halliburton Company agreed to pay $559 million to settle charges for bribes 
paid to Nigerian officials.57 
C. The New International Conventions 
The FCPA was amended again in 1998 as the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Com-
petition Act58 in order to bring American law into line with the new international Con-
vention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions. 
One change of substance made to the 1998 amendment was to legitimate “grease”, 
that is, small rewards or tips to lower-ranking officers “to expedite or to secure the per-
formance of a routine governmental action...”.59 At the lower levels, “grease” may be 
indispensable to the operation of some impoverished governments.60 Another change 
was to extend the law to forbid payments to officials of “public international organiza-
tions.”61 Furthermore, foreign nationals working for American firms were brought 
within the scope of those subject to criminal liability for illicit payments or those classi-
fied as officers. However, those working for foreign subsidiaries were still not included. 
                                                   
55 See Qualters, Risk of Bribe Probe Grows for Business, National Law Journal 9 January 2008, at 8. 
56 See Coyle, Jefferson Case Shows SEC, DOJ Targeting Individuals: Foreign Corrupt Act Case Re-
flects A Trend, National Law Journal, 11 June 2007, at 6. 
57 Driver, Halliburton to pay $559 million to settle bribery probe, Reuters, Jan. 26, 2009, 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/OUSIV/idUSTRE50P5ZE20090126>. 
58 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 
(1998). On the state of the law at that time, see Symposium – A Review of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act on its Twentieth Anniversary: Its Application, Defense and International Aftermath, 
18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 1998, 263; Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1997, 229.  
59 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (1998). See also The Etiquette of Bribery: How to Grease a Palm, Economist, 
23 December 2006, at 115 (noting that tactful strategies are used to ensure that bribes go undetected). 
60 Nye, APSR 1967, 417 et seq. 
61 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1). 
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The 1997 Convention to which these changes respond is part of an international 
movement. Much energy and rhetoric is now being expended around the globe in a 
campaign aimed at deterring transnational corrupt practices. The campaign can be seen 
and heard in such august venues as the World Bank, the International Chamber of 
Commerce, and highly respected non-governmental organisations such as Transparency 
International. 
The present campaign has its origins in the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s. That 
event elevated interest in the international regulation of trade to provide greater stability 
in developing economies. The United States was especially interested in regulating 
transnational bribery in order to level the playing field for American firms subject to the 
FCPA. As a result, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (a group supported by the United States and the International Chamber of 
Commerce) promulgated requirements for signatories to the new Convention. 
That Convention obligates signatory nations to enact criminal laws “functionally 
equivalent” to those prescribed and to cooperate with the enforcement efforts of other 
signatory nations.62 In support of the latter obligation, a system of private peer review was 
established by the OECD. The organisation subjects signatory nations to periodic reviews 
carried out by teams of specialists from at least two other states.63 There is, however, a 
substantive difference between the Convention and the FCPA in that the former does not 
forbid campaign contributions to foreign candidates, as the FCPA does. Moreover, the 
Convention does not obligate signatory nations to enact accounting and record-keeping 
standards corresponding to those enforced in the United States by the SEC. 
As of 2008, thirty-seven nations had ratified this OECD Convention, including most of 
the major players in international commerce.64 Also in 1997, the Organization of Ameri-
can States promulgated the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption;65 it is even 
more explicit in requiring the enactment of specified criminal laws. In 2002, the Council 
of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption entered into force, with forty-six 
signatories.66 In 2003, the African Union opened for signature a similar convention.67 
In 1999, the Council of Europe adopted the Civil Law Convention on Corruption. Its 
aim, as stated by the Council, is to take “into account the need to fight corruption and in 
particular provide for effective remedies for those whose rights and interests are af-
                                                   
62 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Trans-
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fected by corruption.”68 Its signatories are obliged to authorise civil actions to compen-
sate those firms suffering damage as a result of corrupt practices.69 This Convention 
entered into force in 2003. 
And in 2003, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption was opened70 – ne-
gotiated by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime – in Vienna; it has been ratified and is 
now in force in over one hundred countries. Its general tone is reflected in Art. 17: 
“Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may 
be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the 
abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or failure to perform an act, 
in violation of laws, by a public official in the discharge of his or her functions, for the 
purpose of obtaining an undue advantage for himself or herself or for another person 
or entity.” 
A similarly tentative tone is expressed in suggestions that each State Party take action to 
proscribe deliberate concealment of bribes71 or obstruction of justice,72 and provide for 
civil liability if “necessary”.73 It has been said that this UN Convention is to serve as a 
“focal point” in the United States’ campaign against corruption.74 
One may admire all the efforts of those who have secured the promulgation and rati-
fication of these international conventions, and yet question whether they have been 
effective in serving their stated purposes. An empirical study of their effect on the prac-
tices of the officials of weak governments is yet to be carried out: if all the nations rati-
fying one or more of these conventions have enacted criminal laws forbidding their na-
tionals to corrupt weak foreign governments, so what? Are public prosecutors in these 
nations likely to prosecute their fellow nationals or local firms that employ many of 
their fellow nationals? For offering bribes to foreign officials in order to secure con-
tracts or other benefits that would indirectly serve the interests of their fellow nationals? 
How much effort can prosecutors reasonably be expected to expend investigating possi-
ble violations of such criminal laws? How much money will impoverished parliaments 
and legislatures facing competing demands on public resources appropriate to fund such 
investigations and prosecutions? Can the system of peer review established by the 
OECD assure adequate answers to these questions? 
In 2006, the United States undertook to reinforce these efforts of foreign governments 
to enforce these laws. It reiterated a promise made in 2004 to deny entry into the United 
States to any person guilty of corrupting a foreign government. It also announced that 
                                                   
68 Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption Ch. 1, Art. 3, 4 November 1999, available 
at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm>. 
69 Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Explanatory Report Art. 1(a)(6) (1999) 
available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/174.htm>. 
70 See U.N. Convention Against Corruption, 31 October 2003, available at <http://www.unodc.org/ 
pdf/crime/convention_corruption/signing/Convention-e.pdf>. 
71 Id. at Art. 24. 
72 Id. at Art. 25. 
73 Id. at Art. 26. 
74 Dep’t of State Bureau for Int’l Narcotics & Crime Control, Press Release, U.S. Contributes 
$500,000 to Support Implementation of the United Nation Convention Against Corruption (14 De-
cember 2004), available at <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/other/39714.htm>. 
Carrington 
 48
“[t]he U.S. will also work bilaterally and multilaterally to immobilize kleptocratic for-
eign public officials using financial and economic sanctions against them and their 
network of cronies.”75 And it promised to widen the scope of its efforts to seize assets 
acquired through corrupt practices. 
However, the weakness in the global resolve to punish foreign corrupt practices by 
means of criminal law, which is enforced by public servants, was recently and fully re-
vealed by the British government. In 2001, the United Kingdom enacted a criminal law 
Act as required by the OECD Convention. In 2004, its Serious Fraud Office initiated an 
inquiry into bribes allegedly offered by BAE Systems, a British weapons firm to secure 
contracts with the government of Saudi Arabia. In November 2006, it was reported that 
Saudi Arabia would break diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom if the investi-
gation was not dropped.76 In December 2006, the investigation was dropped. Prime 
Minister Blair justified the action by calling attention to the dual needs of securing the 
help of Saudi Arabia in dealing with Palestinian affairs and securing thousands of jobs 
for workers hired to perform the corrupt contract,77 considerations said to outweigh the 
rule of law.  
Perhaps Mr. Blair’s successor will pursue a different course.78 We are told that the is-
sue is one now receiving public attention and has constituted the subject matter of a visit 
to the United Kingdom by members of the Saudi royal family. Meanwhile, it has been 
revealed that Prince Bandar deposited two billion dollars in an American bank account, 
money that had apparently been received from BAE Systems. Consideration may still 
be given to an American prosecution of the case against that firm.79 
However, such cases entailing transnational politics also sometimes present some dif-
ficulty for the United States. A pending case illustrates not only the problem, but also 
the difficulty associated with its solution. James Giffen, an American citizen, was in-
dicted in 2005 for offering bribes to President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan on 
behalf of Mobil, Texaco, Phillips/Conoco, and BP. His alleged offense had gained pub-
lic attention in 2000. After four years of investigation, Giffen was charged with thirteen 
counts of violating the FCPA and thirty-three counts of money laundering. It was al-
leged that fees paid by the oil companies were used by Giffen to purchase an array of 
luxury items, including millions of dollars in jewelry; fur coats for President Nazar-
baev’s wife, Sara, and a daughter, costing nearly $30,000; $45,000 for tuition at an ex-
clusive Swiss high school; and tuition at George Washington University in the U.S. 
capital for Nazarbaev’s daughter, Aliya. Giffen also allegedly bought an $80,000 Donzi 
speedboat for one Balgimbaev to present to Nazarbaev, and two American snowmobiles 
for Nazarbaev and his wife. Giffen claimed to have been acting as a CIA agent or per-
haps a mere “bag man” for the president. President Nazarbaev, who is a friend of 
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American foreign policy in the Middle East, is severely critical of the prosecution and 
might lose his office as a result of it.80 Government witnesses have received death 
threats. The trial has repeatedly been postponed but will perhaps be held in 2008. 
Given such experiences, a skeptic may doubt that these enactments pose a truly seri-
ous threat of punishment to the many firms around the world whose profits seem to de-
pend on their willingness to participate in the corrupt practices of foreign governments. 
Of course, such laws imply a moral judgment, and businessmen are not immune to 
moral suasion. However, as Adam Smith explained centuries ago, moral constraints lose 
their impact as they are applied over greater distances.81 Thus, Benjamin Franklin’s dic-
tum82 applies to a greater extent when the government being corrupted is not one’s own. 
Corrupt practices are by definition secret crimes that can be prevented or deterred only 
through the application of rigorous investigative methods and forceful legal sanctions. 
With its new Civil Law Convention, the Council of Europe acknowledged the need for 
an enforcement mechanism imposing real, adverse economic consequences on firms that 
offer bribes to foreign governments. Moreover, there appears to be rising concern in Ger-
many that German firms have elevated profits through illicit methods: “[g]lobalization”, we 
are told, “has become a vehicle through which corruption is channeled in Germany.”83 
Civil liability is surely the primary legal sanction deterring firms from offering bribes to one 
another’s employees in the private sector, and it is the integrity of governments that is the 
global problem in greatest need of a plausible threat of civil liability. 
The Civil Law Convention is another step forward, but there is as yet no report of civil 
actions against offenders. It brings the Council of Europe into line with the law of the 
United States, as manifested by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the case law recog-
nising bribery of foreign officials by American firms as a tort remediable under RICO or 
the common law of American states.84 However, unlike the FCPA, it does not appear to 
provide a forum for foreign governments seeking compensation from defendants who are 
equally foreign to the nations of the Council whose courts may exercise jurisdiction. 
There is also the very substantial problem that many of the European courts opened to 
claims seeking compensation for harms resulting from corrupt practices, generally show 
less empathy to plaintiffs bringing civil cases. Few if any adhere to the “American rule” 
that a losing plaintiff is not liable for the defendant’s expenses, including attorneys’ 
fees. Although there are variations in laws governing attorneys’ fees, European plain-
tiffs in cases arising under the Civil Law Convention would not likely be permitted to 
retain counsel for a fee contingent upon his or her success in the case. And although 
European courts often conduct penetrating factual inquiries, private plaintiffs enforcing 
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public law in most of the member nations are rarely empowered to conduct private in-
vestigations of the sort permitted by the discovery rules used in American courts. It is 
also questionable whether a plaintiff would have access to government records of the 
sort opened to plaintiffs by “Freedom of Information” or state “sunshine” legislation in 
the United States. Seldom if ever would plaintiffs in European courts be permitted to 
aggregate their claims to make their assertion more economic. And few European courts 
are empowered to issue injunctions enforceable by fines or imprisonment. On account 
of these differences in civil procedure, the European courts are unlikely to interpret the 
Civil Law Convention in a way that would sufficiently and seriously deter European 
firms motivated by the marketplace from engaging in corrupt practices, except for bla-
tant misdeeds. 
One might therefore reasonably assess the enactments of the United States and other 
nations who have since 1998 conformed to all these conventions as a benign but largely 
inconsequential gesture. If an act of corruption should attract substantial public notice, 
the signatory nations have empowered themselves to stand on the side of integrity in 
government by conducting a criminal prosecution. The United States is no longer alone 
in taking that moral stand. Perhaps the many enactments will also serve to increase the 
force of moral suasion against corrupt practices. However, the threat of punishment, 
even in the United States, is often remote and evadable. Besides this, the threat of civil 
liability for resulting harm is no less remote, at least outside the United States. 
D. The False Claims Acts: Qui Tam 
The United States has had ample experiences of its own in confronting problems of cor-
rupt governments,85 and has long sought to deter it through the means of privately en-
forced law with citizens being rewarded for their efforts. 
Corruption was rampant during the American War of Independence; for example, 
Samuel Chase (later Mr. Justice Chase of the United States Supreme Court), was dis-
missed from the Continental Congress for his illicit use of inside information to achieve 
a personal profit.86 As a result of such experiences of the wartime government, the first 
Congress of the United States recognised an ancient English practice identified by the 
Latin phrase qui tam, describing actions brought on behalf of the Crown by one of its 
subjects.87 This law authorised private citizens to represent the United States in claims 
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against those who defraud it, and provided incentives for doing so by assuring them a 
share of any recovery resulting from their efforts.88 
Qui tam was rarely invoked before the Civil War, surely in part because the federal 
government in those decades was not spending large sums exposed to diversion for pri-
vate use. However, because military expenditures in times of war are especially vulner-
able to corruption, the Civil War appeared to generate a series of public scandals reach-
ing the cabinet level. Secretary of War Simon Cameron was dismissed by President 
Lincoln for paying his friends twice the going rate for 1,000 cavalry horses that turned 
out to be afflicted with “every disease horse flesh is heir to.”89 Such scandals led to the 
enactment in 1862 of the False Claims Act, then known as “Lincoln’s Law”.90 That law 
required the offender guilty of defrauding the government to pay double damages, half 
of which would be paid to the relator, that is, the citizen who maintained the case on 
behalf of the United States. Thereafter, numerous relators came forward to pursue 
claims against contractors who were proven to have sold army rifles without triggers, 
gunpowder diluted with sand, or uniforms that could not endure a single rainfall. Per-
haps their lawsuits produced some deterrent effects, elevating the integrity of govern-
ment contractors and the quality of arms supplied to Union soldiers. It certainly restored 
some revenue to the Union treasury from those who had raided it. 
Yet the practice of bringing such suits again fell into disuse. Notorious forms of cor-
ruption resumed once again in the federal government of former General Ulysses 
Grant,91 but none of those who were responsible were sued, either by a relator or by the 
government. A civilian contractor who sold poisoned meat to the Army as it invaded 
Cuba in 1898 was likewise never sued nor prosecuted by the Department of Justice, 
notwithstanding the fact that the formaldehyde with which they preserved the meat 
killed more American soldiers than did the army of Spain that was defending its impe-
rial hold on that island.92 
The occurrence of similar but perhaps less lethal fraudulent crimes was frequent dur-
ing both World Wars, but generally received little attention from the inadequately 
staffed Department of Justice. In 1942, “Lincoln’s Law” was momentarily revived. A 
qui tam action was brought by a perceptive lawyer who as a result of reading his daily 
newspaper’s report of a criminal case brought against the offender by the Department of 
Justice, was alerted to an incident of fraudulent crime against the government. He sued 
the offender for damages and won,93 to the benefit of both himself and the federal treas-
ury. However, the event resulted in threatened government contractors putting pressure 
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on Congress for a 1943 revision of the law to prevent “parasitic” private enforcement 
actions based on previously publicised information already available to the govern-
ment.94 Qui tam actions again subsided. A legislative committee led by Senator (later 
President) Harry Truman exposed many abuses and induced repayment of billions of 
dollars from wartime contractors. However, it did this without imposing any civil liabil-
ity or criminal accountability on the individuals involved.95 Entrepreneurs were also 
otherwise, to a great extent, at liberty to sell weapons or parts of weapons that were use-
less or worse, at prices that bore no relation to the costs of production. 
The larcenous practices continued through wars in Korea and Viet Nam. Industrial 
firms intentionally sold to the United States aircrafts whose wings were shorter than pre-
scribed under safety rules, radar systems that were near-sighted, all-terrain vehicles ready 
to explode on contact, and countless other worthless weapons. It was perhaps acute 
awareness of such problems that prompted President Dwight Eisenhower in his farewell 
address to caution the people of the United States against the greed and ambition of the 
“military industrial complex”.96 It is said that many American soldiers in Viet Nam were 
killed with munitions made by the Vietnamese from American bombs that had failed to 
explode.97 The Department of Defense employed officers to resist plunder by those with 
whom it contracted, but they were often outnumbered and overborne by private experts 
highly paid to confound the government and sell products of disappointing quality at the 
highest possible price. The problem abides; in 2006, the United States Coast Guard re-
ported that it had spent billions on a worthless fleet of new ships.98 
During the Cold War, ever more elaborate weaponry was sold to the United States at 
ever-rising prices. By the 1980s, most of the largest defense contractors were under in-
vestigation for defrauding the Department of Defense (not to mention scores of other 
federal programs buying goods or services). Four (General Electric, GTE (later assimi-
lated into Verizon), Rockwell, and Gould) were convicted.99 The Department of Justice 
was confronted with more cases than it could handle. Senator Chuck Grassley, a con-
servative Republican farmer from Iowa, developed a keen interest in the problem. The 
result was a revision of the False Claims Act – drafted by public-interest lawyers and 
the Department of Justice. It was signed by President Reagan on the eve of the Congres-
sional election, despite desperate protests by the defense industry.100 
                                                   
94 Act of 23 December 1943, Ch. 67, § 3491, Pub. L. No. 213, 57 Stat. 608 (codified as amended at 31 
U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-33 (1986)). 
95 For an account of Truman’s efforts, see McCullough, Truman, New York 1992, 270-88. 
96 President Dwight Eisenhower, Farewell to the Nation (17 January 1961), available at <http://www. 
eisenhower.archives.gov/speeches/farewell_address.html>. 
97 Scammell (op. cit. fn. 89), 14. A case involving a misfiring of a weapon in Cambodia reached the 
Supreme Court. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). 
98 Lipton, Billions Later, Plan to Remake the Coast Guard Fleet Stumbles, N.Y. Times, 9 December 
2006, at A1. See also Editorial, Ships That Don’t Dare to Sail, N.Y. Times, 8 December 2006, at A34. 
99 S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2-3 (1986). 
100 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended at 
31 U.S.C. § 3739(d)(1)-(2) (2000)). A celebration of this legislation is found in Scammell (op. cit. 
fn. 89). A similar provision rewarding whistle-blowers who reveal private fraud was enacted in the 
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)), also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
American Law and Transnational Corruption: Is There a Need for Lincoln’s Law Abroad? 
 53
This 1986 version of the False Claims Act provided for the recovery of treble dam-
ages for defrauding the United States, with fifteen to twenty-five percent of the recovery 
to be paid to the private plaintiff-relator. Proceedings under the Act are not criminal 
proceedings and so proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” is not required; a “preponder-
ance of proof” will, if credited, suffice to support a judgment against the defendant. The 
civil procedural right to compel disclosure of possible evidence101 and to compel non-
party witnesses to supply their evidence as well, may be invoked in its entirety.102 
Moreover, much of the government’s files are exposed to private investigation as a re-
sult of the Freedom of Information Act enacted in 1966.103 The Department of Justice is 
entitled to intervene and preside in matters relating to false claim proceedings, but even 
if it does, the case continues as a civil action and the relator remains a party.104 And if 
the Department of Justice does not intervene, the relator is entitled to maintain the ac-
tion in the name of the United States. Such a relator, if successful, is then entitled to 
receive at least twenty-five percent of the treble damages proceeds, plus reimbursement 
for costs including attorneys’ fees.105 And if the relator is unsuccessful in proving the 
case, there is of course ordinarily no liability for the legal expenses of the defense.106 
This scheme serves to assure the availability of private legal counsel for plaintiffs with 
credible claims based at least in part, on some bit of personal knowledge. The relator is 
also afforded rights protecting him or her from retaliation by an employer.107 
The provision enacted in 1942 that requires a plaintiff seeking compensation as a 
whistle-blower to be an “original source” of the information on which the claim rests 
has been retained.108 In 2007, the Supreme Court held that the relator is not entitled to 
compensation where the Department of Justice assumes leadership over the case and 
also if won on a ground different from that initially advanced by the relator.109 
By 2005, almost 9,000 false-claim cases had been filed pursuant to the 1986 statute. 
A majority of these cases were initiated by whistle-blowing citizen-relators; thirty-three 
whistle-blowers came forward in 1987 and by 2002 the number had risen to 326.110 The 
number has continued to rise. Although historically, the bulk of the false claims actions 
were directed at those who provide goods or services to the military, other industries 
have become frequent targets for qui tam claims. At present, four out of five current 
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false-claims cases are brought against health-care providers accused of overpricing 
goods or services paid for by the Department of Health and Human Services.111 
In 2006, Congress enacted a provision rewarding states for enacting similar laws ap-
plicable especially to health care providers.112 Other applications have also evolved; for 
example, educational institutions are being sued to recover the value of student loans 
provided by the Department of Education and used for tuition to fund programs that 
failed to meet the minimum standards of accreditation organisations. A whistle-blower 
could possibly represent the United States in making a claim against a bank or other 
creditors who lent money to the United States with the knowledge that such funds 
would be used to finance corrupt practices, such as the purchase of goods or services at 
twice their market price, or to fund the Governor’s Swiss bank account. 
A charitable organisation, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, provides tips, 
information, and support to a variety of relators.113 It has criticised the Department of 
Justice for failing to invest sufficient resources in the enforcement of the law, even fail-
ing to expend funds that have been appropriated specifically for that purpose. It has also 
directed criticism at government contractors for failing to provide their employees with 
information about the law so as to make them aware of rewards offered to whistle-
blowing relators.114 
The False Claims Act is, of course, applicable to transactions between the United 
States and foreign providers of goods or services. The statute provides for personal ser-
vice of process anywhere in the world so long as it is in conformity with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.115 Subject only to the limits imposed by the constitutional 
requirement of Due Process, jurisdiction over firms outside the United States is estab-
lished in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.116 Anyone in the 
world with such close links to the federal government to defraud it should surely have 
sufficient contacts to satisfy the requirements of Due Process, and would thus be subject 
to personal jurisdiction in that court. The discovery of evidence abroad is available and 
facilitated by foreign governments, or at least by those committed to the Hague Conven-
tion on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters.117 A foreign 
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party who refuses to provide documents or other evidence upon demand is subject to an 
adverse judgment on the merits of the dispute, it being reasonably inferred that the evi-
dence the party refuses to produce on request would confirm the allegation of the adver-
sary.118 Presumably such a civil action could proceed even against a foreign government 
under the “commercial exception” provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act.119 
Whether the final judgment of a federal court against a false-claims defendant would be 
effectively enforced abroad is, however, questionable.120 
Of the fifteen billion dollars recovered by the United States in the 9,000 false-claims 
cases pursued from 1987 to 2005, about two-thirds were recovered in qui tam cases initi-
ated by citizen-relators.121 In 2003, the United States recovered eighty-five million dollars 
in qui tam cases that the Department of Justice declined to pursue and left to the solitary 
efforts of relators and their private counsel. The median recovery in such private qui tam 
cases was $784,597, and the median relator’s share was $123,885. Substantial legal trea-
tises have been generated to record the numerous decisions interpreting the Act.122 
As one would expect, the business and industry sectors have sought to undermine the 
development of the False Claims Act as a scheme for rewarding self-seeking trouble-
makers, unfaithful employees, and greedy tort lawyers. It is a development contrary to 
the aim of American Business to achieve “tort reform” by diminishing its exposures to 
civil liability and thus its accountability for the harms it imposes on others. 
In 1993, Attorney General William Pelham Barr, with the approval of President 
George H. W. Bush, questioned the constitutionality of the 1986 law as a violation of 
separation of powers because it interfered with the prosecutorial discretion of the De-
partment of Justice.123 This argument struck at the primary reason for the law, that is, 
public mistrust of prosecutors. All prosecutors and government attorneys in the United 
States, even those with job security as civil servants, are, like the British prosecutor, 
subject to the oversight of political officeholders. Most of these political officeholders 
were, or are, dependent on the political and monetary support of businesses, especially 
those businesses that deal with the government. Such firms are, with few exceptions, 
not only major contributors to political campaigns but also major employers of lobby-
ists, two practices that seem to have displaced bribery as the primary methods through 
which capitalists profitably influence American government.124 As the Supreme Court 
has steadily increased the First Amendment right on the expenditure of money to influ-
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ence political outcomes,125 the sums of money spent on political campaigns have ele-
vated beyond levels that could have been imagined even a few decades ago.126 Prosecu-
tors and other government lawyers do still instigate proceedings against businessmen 
who offend the law and defraud the government, but they are inevitably constrained 
from doing so by political realities and their limited office budgets. What Attorney 
General Barr sought to secure was the discretion of government lawyers to look the 
other way when their political supervisors’ friends, supporters, and campaign contribu-
tors were suspected of resorting to improper means of acquiring government contracts. 
In rejecting Attorney General Barr’s argument, the Ninth Circuit upheld the law and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.127 
Nevertheless, firms in the health-care industry who have been beset with fraud claims 
in the last decade were still keen in 2007 to undermine the False Claims Act as enacted 
in 1986.128 Some did prevail in getting the Supreme Court to rule in 2000 that state hos-
pitals cannot be exposed to liability under the statute for overcharging Medicare because 
of their defense of sovereign immunity, but in that case the Court also unreservedly ac-
knowledged the constitutionality of the Act, rejecting the earlier argument made by At-
torney General Barr and his supporters that it interfered with the discretion of the Ex-
ecutive Branch.129 Firms have had better luck in evading the federal law protecting 
whistle-blowers from retaliation, but Congress may soon withdraw jurisdiction from the 
federal court that seems to be hostile to their claims.130 
Claims for the benefit of state governments arising from the same transactions as 
those defrauding the federal government may be conjoined with a qui tam action 
brought in the name of the United States.131 By 2006, there were eighteen state enact-
ments similar to the federal law.132 However, three of those states have restricted the 
laws to the health-care industry,133 presumably to shield those who build highways or 
other public works from the increased threat of liability for corrupt practices. Perhaps 
the distinction reflects greater trust in highway contractors, or perhaps their greater in-
fluence on state legislatures. And perhaps such laws might serve to modify the corrupt 
“way things are done” in Illinois, as presently reported.134 
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In December 2006, the idea of rewarding whistle-blowers was extended by the United 
States to reward private enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code. No longer will the 
federal government rely solely on the beleaguered and understaffed Internal Revenue 
Service to detect unreported or underreported income.135 Advocates predicted that this 
reform will increase federal tax revenue by many billions of dollars a year,136 and per-
haps enable the United States to balance its budget at reduced tax rates. The optimism 
might be realistic if all citizens are made fully aware of their entitlement upon perform-
ance of the public duty to correct and deter tax cheating, which is surely one of the most 
popular of the nation’s indoor sports. 
The United Kingdom, Korea, and the Netherlands, and perhaps some other nations, 
have enacted laws to encourage and protect whistle-blowers who alert prosecutors to 
frauds committed against their governments.137 The resistance of businessmen to such 
legislation tends to confirm the need for it, but quantifying deterrent effects is a difficult 
task. There is no doubt that businesses and industries in the United States have incurred 
substantial legal costs in defending 10,000 civil actions brought under the False Claims 
Act since 1986. Yet it is also apparent that the federal treasury and its taxpayers have 
benefited immensely, and that state governments are likely to benefit in the same man-
ner. For citizens who dislike paying taxes, especially more taxes than identically situ-
ated tax cheaters, claims and recoveries won by whistle-blowing relators are without 
question a comfort. 
Certainly, the False Claims Act is not without its critics. There is some anxiety about 
the frequency of false claims.138 However, the data invoked in support of such concern 
is not convincing; the proportion of claims that prevail is reasonably close to the aver-
age for civil claims. No doubt the best cases are presided over by the Department of 
Justice, but there is no reason to believe that it has the resources and energy to identify 
such winning cases without the help of whistle-blowers. Moreover, some cases declined 
by the Department have been won by private lawyers. There is, of course, a litigation 
cost borne by defendants, but it does not appear to be significantly greater when com-
pared to those costs associated with other numerous endeavors of private law enforcers. 
There is no data whereby the deterrent effect of such law can be measured, but there is 
little reason to doubt that a fair assessment of the deterrent effect should add to the bil-
lions recovered from false claimants - along with other billions that the government 
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would have paid if those with whom it were dealing were confident that no one other 
than the Department of Justice would notice and draw attention to their misdeeds.139 
E. A Comparison: The Byrd Amendment 
A cautionary note about the American model of law enforcement by private plaintiffs was 
sounded by the law enacted by Congress in 2000 to encourage whistle-blowing in regard 
to other illicit practices in international trade. The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Off-
set Act of that year,140 generally known as the Byrd Amendment, deeply troubled those 
committed to free trade. It provides an example of a whistle-blowing reward system not to 
be replicated in addressing the problem of corruption of foreign governments. 
The Byrd Amendment rewarded whistle-blowing firms who were critics of the prac-
tice whereby imports were allegedly sold to American buyers at prices below produc-
tion cost. Such practice was facilitated by according the buyers the status of beneficiar-
ies of any tariff imposed and collected by United States Customs in response to their 
complaints. Grievances lodged against the United States with the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) in response to this legislation were entirely justified. “Anti-dumping” 
law, although permitted by the WTO,141 is at best a questionable policy.142 Businesses 
world-wide do not regularly sell goods below cost unless perhaps monopolisation or the 
extermination of competitors is a price in view. The American law against dumping was 
originally enacted as part of the antitrust law; it has allowed the Customs Office to im-
pose tariffs on allegedly dumped goods by assuming that the cost of making them is the 
same everywhere; if the goods in question cannot be produced in the most costly place, 
say, Canada, for less than the import price, then they are being “dumped” within the 
meaning of this highly questionable law. The real cost borne by the manufacturer is 
irrelevant. The Byrd Amendment then directs that all the proceeds of this protective 
tariff be distributed to the protected firms who “blew the whistle” by calling the atten-
tion of the Customs Office to the fact that an imported product could not be made in the 
most costly foreign place for the price being paid by American purchasers. A domestic 
competitor who failed to blow the whistle on the low price would not share in the lar-
gesse of Customs. Hundreds of millions of dollars were collected annually by Customs 
in response to such complaints and then distributed only to those who blew a whistle. 
The taxpayers gained nothing. 
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Byrd Amendment whistle-blowers, unlike those who enforce the False Claims Act, 
bore no costs and took no risks. The federal government would conduct an administra-
tive proceeding to hear accusations of dumping, without charge to the complaining 
party. Such proceeding was simple: the hearing officer would merely estimate the costs 
of manufacture likely to occur if the product were made in the nation designated by the 
relator. This law may perhaps, in all fairness, be regarded as corruption in reverse. The 
Government expends efforts to pay to American firms sums that they have not earned in 
the marketplace. Should one even consider this as a reverse bribe? Is it not likely that 
some of what has been distributed to such whistle-blowers could find its way into cam-
paign contributions of those politicians who devised the scheme or those responsible for 
enforcement beneficial to their whistle-blowing patrons? 
Eleven nations vigorously voiced their protests against the Byrd Amendment to the 
World Trade Organization; they were authorised by the WTO to retaliate against the 
United States.143 Canada was the first to do so; it imposed sanctions on American 
trade.144 And in 2006 Congress relented,145 although not immediately. 
However, the idea of private enforcement of international trade law may have merits 
that the Byrd Amendment conceals. If the factual issue of dumping were to be presented 
to a disinterested forum, and if the relator and his or her lawyer were willing to risk in-
curring the expense of presenting the case, the scheme might make sense. It might even 
be the best method of enforcing such laws, assuming that anti-dumping laws serve a 
valid public purpose of preventing monopolisation. Its advantage would be that the 
rights of firms competing in the marketplace would be less dependent on their amiable 
relations with politicians and the government lawyers they employ. 
F. Lincoln’s Law for Foreign Plaintiffs? 
Notwithstanding this cautionary tale, might the FCPA, in light of the frailty of the interna-
tional efforts to date, be amended to authorise qui tam proceedings on behalf of foreign 
governments? Although the FCPA is only a mechanism of criminal law, it does, as noted 
above, provide civil plaintiffs, including foreign governments seeking compensation for 
harms resulting from tortious corrupt practices, with access to American courts. A possi-
ble additional basis for jurisdiction in such cases in the federal courts of the United States 
is provided by the Alien Tort Act enacted in 1789.146 That Act opened the courts of the 
United States to civil tort claims brought to correct violations of international law wher-
ever they occurred. The Supreme Court has recently clarified the eighteenth-century law 
to assure that the international law invoked by the plaintiff is truly embedded in a treaty, 
and not in a principle of natural law invented by judges to condemn what they perceive to 
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have been a misdeed.147 Surely the ratifications of the many previously enumerated trea-
ties confirm (if the question was ever in doubt) that bribery is now an international tort of 
the sort remedied by the old Alien Tort Act. Like piracy on the high seas, it is forbidden 
by the laws of every government in the world. And it was so in 1789, even if transnational 
bribery had not yet been widely acknowledged or forbidden in the nations of the bribers. 
All manner of human-rights claims have been brought to the United States under the 
Alien Tort Act, but few if any commercial tort claims have been brought.148 A pertinent 
example of the former type of claim is a case presently pending in the federal court in 
Manhattan brought by Nigerian plaintiffs claiming that the Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company paid officers of the Nigerian government to punish Nigerians demonstrating 
against environmental harms allegedly caused by Royal Dutch, resulting in the death of 
the plaintiff’s decedent.149 
A victimised foreign government could under the existing law invoke jurisdiction in 
American courts in an action to recover any payments it may have made for goods or 
services in excess of what it would have paid if the corruption of its officials by the de-
fendants had not occurred. There are thus a number of governments that may have been 
negligent in not commencing such civil actions in American courts. Doubtless a disin-
centive to such actions by foreign governments is that their lawyers would need to pro-
duce evidence in an American court challenging the integrity of their own fellow na-
tionals. But at least in times following a change of regime, that obstacle might be re-
garded as a political incentive to proceed. 
Congress could also, at least possibly, make the False Claims Act process available to 
foreign governments and their citizens. Foreign nationals could be permitted to sue in 
the name of their governments that have been corrupted by a defendant who is subject 
to the personal jurisdiction of the court in which the action is brought. Congress also 
could prescribe an award of damages commensurate with the damages provisions of the 
False Claims Act in order to provide individuals and their lawyers – as well as govern-
ments – with the incentives needed to investigate apparent corrupt practices and to ad-
vance their claims. 
Perhaps citizens of Kazakhstan could thus be encouraged to proceed in the name of 
their republic with a claim against American oil companies for the damages resulting 
from the bribery of their president. Such a foreign subject or citizen could be equipped 
with procedural rights equal to those conferred on American citizens by American 
courts, procedural rights that are not generally available in courts of most other nations. 
These include (1) the “American Rule” that losers do not pay winners’ attorneys’ fees in 
the absence of specific legislation to the contrary; (2) access to contingent-fee lawyers; 
(3) the right to discover evidence in the United States and abroad; (4) trial by jury; (5) a 
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standard of proof requiring no more than a demonstration of probability of guilt; and (6) 
the possibility of a class action where many firms or persons have suffered harms as a 
result of one proven bribe. These are, as previously noted, among the instruments 
through which much American public law is often enforced by private plaintiffs, and 
they could be made available to foreign plaintiffs representing their governments. 
The United States should have no reason to dread the financial cost of providing its 
judicial services to protect weak foreign governments in this way. The income-tax reve-
nue generated by American lawyers representing the parties in such cases would surely 
offset the costs incurred by federal courts. And the foreign whistle-blowers could, if 
need be, quite reasonably be required to pay additional court costs to protect the federal 
treasury from loss. 
There are, however, at least three limitations on the effectiveness of such a solo effort 
by the United States to correct the international problem.150 One is the limit of the long 
arm of American courts. Personal jurisdiction would be lacking over many of the de-
fendants who ought to be subject to suit if the law is to be effective in discouraging 
world wide transnational corruption. Jurisdictional limits would obviously present no 
problems for suits against American defendants, but would serve to prevent the deter-
rent effects on those foreign firms not subject to the personal jurisdiction of American 
courts, that is, those lacking the “minimum contacts” required by the constitutional Due 
Process. Foreign whistleblowers could use American courts to enforce their laws 
against American firms but not against many foreign competitors. 
There is a possible partial solution to this problem. It is to make the extended FCPA 
available only to citizens and governments of nations that have enacted similar legisla-
tion requiring international firms with whom they do business to consent to the jurisdic-
tion of an American court in private actions brought to enforce the international law 
against corrupt practices. Surely there would be no rush on the part of sovereign nations 
to seize the opportunity provided. Moreover, such sovereign nations might be expected 
to encounter serious difficulty in concluding favourable contracts with many foreign 
firms unwilling to expose themselves to suit in the United States. Nevertheless, such an 
invitational enactment by the United States might be recognised as an additional and 
earnest effort to lend a hand to weak governments beset by corruption, an effort more 
earnest than the FCPA. It is also at least theoretically possible that the World Bank 
might condition some of its loans on such local legislation in order to reduce the likeli-
hood that proceeds from its loans are wasted on corrupt practices. 
A second limitation on the effectiveness of such a solo effort by the United States is 
the limited ability of American courts to enforce judgments against defendants whose 
assets are beyond American reach. One might hope that foreign courts would lend a 
hand in collecting the judgments rendered pursuant to such legislation and against firms 
that are within the constitutional reach of American courts, but experience suggests that 
this is unlikely unless perchance a change could be made in the governing transnational 
law to commit foreign courts to enforce judgments rendered in the United States. Re-
cent experience with efforts at The Hague to reach an agreement on the enforcement of 
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foreign judgments provides little encouragement.151 A possible impediment to agree-
ment is a longstanding international tradition that the courts of one nation do not en-
force the public revenue laws of another,152 a tradition reflecting the sharp distinction 
between public and private law common to the legal systems of many nations. 
Is it possible that such an agreement on the enforcement of foreign judgments could 
be achieved more easily if it were limited to judgments arising from civil actions 
brought to enforce the international law against bribery? If the “developed nations” of 
OECD are serious about putting an end to the corrupt practices that so disable govern-
ments in “developing nations,” then such a revision of the present conventions on the 
enforcement of foreign judgments might be possible. Then the state victims of corrup-
tion and even their whistleblowers could choose any forum. 
A problem to be confronted in such a negotiation of a revised OECD convention on 
judgments is that most plaintiffs usually choose American courts. Whereas the courts of 
other nations that have ratified the Civil Law Convention of the Council of Europe 
would also be open to private enforcement of the international law, and might thus also 
impose the risk of civil liability on offenders who engage in bribery and on those firms 
that employ them, they do not generally offer the same package of procedural rights 
available to plaintiffs in American courts. As an eminent English Master of the Rolls 
put it, “as a moth is drawn to the light”,153 plaintiffs are attracted to American courts. 
The proposal would therefore be likely to elevate the concerns of Europeans who resent 
the pretentiousness of American courts esteemed as “world courts,” as they are some-
times prone to do.154 
A third limitation on the application of such American law is the limited ability of the 
American government to protect foreign whistle-blowers from retaliation to the degree 
they are able to offer to American whistle-blowers. Perhaps whistle-blowers could be 
provided asylum under existing international laws. That possibility might provide ex-
cessive incentives to citizens of failing states who would acquire not only the proceeds 
of their suits against former employers, but would also be assured access to a better life-
style in a “developed” country. 
We may conclude that the extension of the FCPA to provide for qui tam proceedings 
on behalf of foreign governments is still a “work in progress”, at least until a narrowly 
framed judgments convention has been negotiated to assure effective enforcement in 
foreign courts of resulting judgments against firms who consented to jurisdiction as a 
condition of doing business with the weak government to be protected. However, until 
some forum of this sort is provided, one is entitled to be skeptical about the commit-
ment of OECD nations to efforts aimed at deterring the corrupt practices of weak na-
tional governments. 
                                                   
151 See supra fn. 120. 
152 See, e.g., Planche v. Fletcher (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165; Her Majesty the Queen In re The Prov-
ince of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F. 2d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 1979). 
153 Smith Kline & French Lab., Ltd v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (C.A.) (Lord Denning, Master of 
the Rolls). 
154 Michaels, Gerichte als Weltgerichte – Die Avantgarde der Globalisierung, 31 DAJV-Newsletter 46 
(2006). 
American Law and Transnational Corruption: Is There a Need for Lincoln’s Law Abroad? 
 63
G. A Transnational Forum for Private Enforcement? 
In any case, a solo effort by the United States to address the problem of corruption of 
foreign states by foreign firms is obviously far less attractive than one engaging the 
support of the whole community of nations having a stake in international trade and in 
the stability of weak governments. Could an international court which is as hospitable 
as American courts, be devised as a solution to help plaintiffs seeking to impose civil 
liability on those who corrupt foreign governments? Alas, effective world government 
remains a distant vision, but modest steps in that direction are gradually being taken.155 
For example, the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
was created in 1965 in response to an initiative of the World Bank.156 Its jurisdiction is 
presently limited to claims against member states, but 155 nations have agreed to en-
force its awards. Perhaps the World Bank could devise a similar institution to deal with 
the transnational corruption problem. It has been suggested that the World Bank could 
refuse to fund government contracts to be performed by firms identified as corrupt;157 a 
process for identifying corrupt contractors might impose other consequences on the 
firms identified. However, it would be confronted with the necessity of securing ratifi-
cation of the scheme by the nations expected to enforce its awards. 
Or possibly the International Chamber of Commerce might create a comparable arbi-
tral institution whose awards would also be enforceable worldwide, under the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.158 An obvious 
problem is that the Convention providing for enforcement of international arbitration 
awards assumes that the forum’s jurisdiction rests on the consent of the parties, a condi-
tion that would be lacking in all international qui tam cases. Possibly, as suggested 
above in regard to the prospect of jurisdiction in American courts, the consent problem 
might be addressed by individual governments enacting laws giving consent to arbitra-
tion before the ICC corrupt practices panel – a condition of all public contracts, includ-
ing contracts of employment.159 
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Another possible concern is that the present Convention on Foreign Awards vests 
discretion in the enforcing court to refuse enforcement of awards offending its notions 
of sound public policy.160 Moreover, there is no treaty requiring courts around the world 
to enforce civil judgments that offend local laws. Firms planning to engage in corrupt 
practices might therefore be able to find sanctuary nations in which assets could be kept 
beyond the reach of plaintiffs seeking to enforce their awards. 
If the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, the OECD, or the International 
Chamber of Commerce were to provide an effective forum for the private enforcement 
of corruption law, they would need to empower the whistle-blowing relator and his or 
her lawyer representing a government to conduct a factual investigation much as a pub-
lic prosecutor might. American rules of procedure bearing on discovery161 surely need 
not be incorporated, but they serve to illustrate what would be needed to empower pri-
vate counsel to investigate and reveal corrupt conducts. Truly effective international law 
would also foreclose government secrecy in those nations to be protected so that offi-
cials and their files could be subject to judicial scrutiny. 
Perhaps international lawmakers also need to take another leaf from the False Claims 
Act and provide for double or treble damages to be divided among the relator, his or her 
counsel, and the victimised government. The class action would also merit considera-
tion. Finally, the lawmakers would need to consider means of protecting whistle-
blowers by imposing further liability on employers who might be tempted to retaliate 
against their disloyalty to the firm. The possibility of a whistle-blower’s right to migrate 
would be appropriate in some circumstances. 
If such a forum were established to facilitate private enforcement of laws prohibiting 
bribery, it could also be given jurisdiction to decide factual issues arising in the applica-
tion of the odious debt doctrine, thereby lending some legitimacy to decisions appropri-
ately refusing to honor corrupt debts. Furthermore, private citizens could possibly be 
permitted to present odious debt claims on behalf of their governments. 
There seems to be no immediate prospect of the ICC or the World Bank or the United 
Nations, or any other organisation taking on the task of creating a forum through which 
effective private enforcement of international corruption law could occur. However, it 
may be that the time has arrived for deliberation on the possibilities. Others have noted 
the difficulty and the need for transnational institutions to find a means of gaining a 
measure of trust from the citizens on whose behalf they presume to govern.162 If a court 
were to be created, the American tradition would be ripe for study. 
                                                   
160 Convention (supra fn. 158) Art. V(2)(b). 
161 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37, 45. 
162  See Dahl, On Political Equality, New Haven 2006, 87-92. 
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H. Conclusion 
Perhaps those institutions invited to this conference to enact legislation or to ratify a 
treaty establishing the means for effective private enforcement of international laws 
forbidding corrupt practices might take comfort from the knowledge that the qui tam 
device proposed has an ancient and honorable history. Such legislation is rooted in the 
recognition of the frailties of government, and the limits of what can be demanded from 
government lawyers in a fragmented social order. The world has long known that when 
developing nations are forced to rely wholly on their public prosecutors to impose 
criminal punishment on their fellow nationals and their partners in crime, corrupt prac-
tices are expected to flourish. This is especially true in those developing nations blessed 
with natural resources that can be stripped for the benefit of firms, and for those politi-
cians able to extract bribes from such firms. This reality is now widely acknowledged, 
but the responses of developed nations have not been adequate in addressing it. 
Shocking though the thought is, what the world may need and what effective global-
isation of the marketplace requires, are thousands of plaintiffs’ lawyers (yes, just the 
American sort so despised by Business) who are motivated and empowered to investi-
gate the bribery of officials of weak governments and present their evidence to a forum 
that is in turn invulnerable to bribery or intimidation. 
 
